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Abstract. Popular matchings have recently been a subject of study in
the context of the so-called House Allocation Problem, where the ob-
jective is to match applicants to houses over which the applicants have
preferences. A matching M is called popular if there is no other matching
M ′ with the property that more applicants prefer their allocation in M ′
to their allocation in M . In this paper we study popular matchings in the
context of the Roommates Problem, including its special (bipartite) case,
the Marriage Problem. We investigate the relationship between popu-
larity and stability, and describe efficient algorithms to test a matching
for popularity in these settings. We also show that, when ties are per-
mitted in the preferences, it is NP-hard to determine whether a popular
matching exists in both the Roommates and Marriage cases.
1 Introduction
Background. Stable matching problems have a long history, dating back to the
seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [9], and these problems continue as an area
of active research among computer scientists, mathematicians and economists
[13, 25]. An instance of the classical Stable Marriage problem (sm) involves sets
of n men and n women, and each person has a strict order of preference (their
preference list) over all of the members of the opposite sex. A stable matching
M is a set of n disjoint man-woman pairs such that no man m and woman w
who do not form a pair prefer each other to their partners in M . The Stable
Roommates problem (sr) is the generalisation of sm to the non-bipartite case,
where each person has a strict order of preference over all of the others.
Gale and Shapley [9] showed that every instance of sm admits a stable match-
ing, and such a matching can be found in O(n2) time, whereas, by contrast, some
sr instances admit no stable matching. Irving [15] gave an O(n2) time algorithm
to find a stable matching in an sr instance, when one exists.
A wide range of extensions of these fundamental problems have been studied.
For instance, the existence results and efficient algorithms extend to the case
where preference lists are incomplete, i.e., when participants can declare some of
the others to be unacceptable as partners. In this case, both the Gale-Shapley
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algorithm and Irving’s algorithm can be adapted to run in O(m) time, where
m is the sum of the lengths of the preference lists [13]. Furthermore, in this
case, it is known that all stable matchings have the same size and match exactly
the same people [10, 13]. If, in addition, ties are permitted in an individual’s
preferences, then the situation becomes more complex. Here, a stable matching
always exists, but different stable matchings can have different sizes, and it is
NP-hard to find a stable matching of maximum (or minimum) size [16, 18]. In
the Roommates case it is NP-complete to determine whether a stable matching
exists (even if preference lists are complete) [24].
Here, we are interested in the Marriage and Roommates scenarios, where each
participant expresses preferences over some or all of the others, but we focus on
matchings that are popular rather than stable. A matchingM is popular if there
is no other matching M ′ with the property that more participants prefer M ′ to
M than prefer M to M ′. M is strongly popular if, for any other matching M ′,
more participants prefer M to M ′ than prefer M ′ to M . These concepts were
introduced in the Marriage context by Ga¨rdenfors [11].
Recently, popular matchings have been studied in the context of the so-called
House Allocation problem (ha). An instance of ha involves a set of applicants
and a set of houses. Each applicant has a strict order of preference over the
houses that are acceptable to him, but houses have no preference over applicants.
Abraham et al. [1] described an O(n + m) time algorithm to find a popular
matching, if one exists, in an instance of ha, where n is the total number of
applicants and houses, and m is the total number of acceptable applicant-house
pairs. In the case that ties are allowed in the preference lists, they gave an
O(
√
nm) time algorithm. These results motivated the present study.
The contribution of this paper. Our prime focus in this paper is the prob-
lem of finding popular matchings in the Roommates and Marriage contexts. In
Section 2 we formalise the problem descriptions and give the necessary termi-
nology and notation. In Section 3 we focus on strict preferences. We describe
some basic properties of popular matchings, and the more restrictive strongly
popular matchings, and their relation to stable matchings. We give a linear
time algorithm to test for and to find a strongly popular matching for Room-
mates instances without ties. We show that, given a Roommates instance (with
or without ties) and a matching M , we can test whether M is popular in
O(
√
nα(n,m)m log3/2 n) time (where α is the inverse Ackermann’s function),
and in the Marriage case we show how this can be improved to O(
√
nm) time.
This latter result generalises a previous O(
√
nm) algorithm for the special case
where preference lists may include ties and are symmetric (i.e., a man m ranks
a woman w in kth place if and only if w ranks m in kth place) [26]. In Section
4 we first investigate which of the results of Section 3 can be extended to the
case of ties. Then we establish an NP-completeness result for the problem of
determining whether a popular matching exists for a Marriage (or Roommates)
instance with ties. We conclude with some open problems in Section 5.
Related work. Ga¨rdenfors [11] introduced the notions of a (strong) majority
assignment, which is equivalent to a (strongly) popular matching in our termi-
nology. He proved that every stable matching is popular in the Marriage case
with strict preferences. Also, he showed that a strongly popular matching is
stable in the Marriage case, even if there are ties in the preference lists.
The results of Abraham et al. [1] mentioned above led to a number of sub-
sequent papers exploring further aspects and extensions of popular matchings
in ha. Manlove and Sng [19] studied the extension in which each house has a
capacity, the maximum number of applicants that can be assigned to it in any
matching, and gave a O(
√
Cn1 +m) time algorithm for this variant, where C
is the sum of the capacities of the houses and n1 is the number of applicants.
Mestre [22] gave a linear time algorithm for a version of the problem in which
each applicant has an associated weight. This algorithm, which assumes that all
houses have capacity 1, was extended by Sng and Manlove [27] to the case where
houses can have non-unitary capacities. Mahdian [17] showed that, for random
instances of ha, popular matchings exist with high probability if the number
of houses exceeds the number of applicants by a small constant multiplicative
factor. Abraham and Kavitha [2] studied a dynamic version of ha allowing for
applicants and houses to enter and leave the market, and for applicants to arbi-
trarily change their preference lists. They showed the existence of a 2-step voting
path to compute a new popular matching after every such change, assuming that
a popular matching exists. McCutchen [20] focused on instances of ha for which
no popular matching exists, defining two notions of ‘near popularity’, and prov-
ing that, for each of these, finding a matching that is as near to popular as
possible is NP-hard. Huang et al. [14] built upon the work of McCutchen with a
study of approximation algorithms in the context of near popularity. McDermid
and Irving [21] characterised the structure of the set of popular matchings for an
ha instance, and gave efficient algorithms to count and enumerate the popular
matchings, and to find several kinds of optimal popular matchings.
In voting theory, a well-established concept of majority equilibrium is the
following. Let S = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a society of n individuals, and let X be a
set of alternatives. Each individual i ∈ S has a preference order, ≥i, on X . An
alternative x ∈ X is called a weak Condorcet winner if for every y ∈ X distinct
of x, |{i ∈ S : x >i y}| ≥ |{i ∈ S : y >i x}|; x is a strong Condorcet winner if
for every y ∈ X distinct of x, |{i ∈ S : x >i y}| > |{i ∈ S : y >i x}|. It is easy
to see that if the set of alternatives is the set of all possible matchings of the
individuals then a matching is a weak (respectively strong) Condorcet winner if
and only if it is popular (respectively strongly popular). Therefore recent papers
of Chen et al., see e.g. [4], which deal with the problems of finding a weak and
strong Concordet winner for special graph models, are related to our work.
2 Problem descriptions, terminology and notation
Since the Roommates problem can be seen as an extension of the Marriage
problem, we introduce our notation and terminology in the former setting. An
instance I of the Roommates Problem (rp) comprises a set of agents A =
{a1, . . . , an}. For each agent ai there is a subset Ai of A \ {ai} containing ai’s
acceptable partners, and ai has a linear order over Ai, which we refer to as ai’s
preference list. If aj precedes ak in ai’s preference list, we say that ai prefers
aj to ak. We are also interested in the extension of rp, called the Roommates
Problem with Ties (rpt), in which preference lists may contain tied entries, so
that ai prefers aj to ak if and only if aj is a strict predecessor of ak in ai’s
preference list. We say that agent ai is indifferent between aj and ak if aj and
ak are tied in his preference list.
An instance I of rp may also be viewed as a graph G = (A,E) where {ai, aj}
forms an edge in E if and only if ai and aj are each acceptable to the other. We
assume that G contains no isolated vertices, and we let m = |E|. We refer to G
as the underlying graph of I. A matching in I is a set of disjoint edges in the
underlying graph G.
An instance of the Marriage Problem with Ties (mpt) may be viewed as
an instance of rpt in which the underlying graph G is bipartite. The Marriage
Problem (mp) is the analogous restriction of rp. In either case, the two sets of
the bipartition are known as the men and the women.
Let I be an instance of rpt. Let M denote the set of matchings in I, and
let M ∈ M. Given any ai ∈ A, if {ai, aj} ∈ M for some aj ∈ A, we say that ai
is matched in M and M(ai) denotes aj , otherwise ai is unmatched in M .
We define the preferences of an agent over matchings as follows. Given two
matchings M and M ′ in M, we say that an agent ai prefers M ′ to M if either
(i) ai is matched in M
′ and unmatched in M , or (ii) ai is matched in both M
′
and M and prefers M ′(ai) to M(ai). Let P (M
′,M) denote the set of agents
who prefer M ′ to M , and let I(M ′,M) be the set of agents who are indifferent
between M ′ and M (i.e., ai ∈ I(M ′,M) if and only if either (i) ai is matched in
both M ′ and M and either (a) M ′(ai) =M(ai) or (b) ai is indifferent between
M ′(ai) andM(ai), or (ii) ai is unmatched in both M
′ andM). Then P (M,M ′),
P (M ′,M) and I(M ′,M) (=I(M,M ′)) partition A.
A blocking pair with respect to a matchingM ∈M is an edge {ai, aj} ∈ E\M
such that each of ai and aj prefers {{ai, aj}} to M . A matching is stable if it
admits no blocking pair. As observed earlier, an instance of rp or rpt may or
may not admit a stable matching, whereas every instance of mp or mpt admits
at least one such matching.
Given two matchings M and M ′ in M, define D(M,M ′) = |P (M,M ′)| −
|P (M ′,M)|. Clearly D(M,M ′) = −D(M ′,M). We say that M is more popular
than M ′, denoted M ≻ M ′, if D(M,M ′) > 0. M is popular if D(M,M ′) ≥ 0
for all matchings M ′ ∈ M. Also M is strongly popular if D(M,M ′) > 0 for all
matchings M ′ ∈M\{M}.1
Furthermore, for a set of agents S ⊆ V (G), let PS(M,M ′) denote the sub-
set of S whose members prefer M to M ′. Let DS(M,M
′) = |PS(M,M ′)| −
|PS(M ′,M)|. We say that M ≻S M ′ if DS(M,M ′) > 0. We will also use the
1 In fact it is not difficult to see that M is popular if D(M, M ′) ≥ 0 for all maximal
matchings M ′ ∈ M, and M is strongly popular if D(M, M ′) > 0 for all maximal
matchings M ′ ∈ M\{M}.
standard notation M |S for the restriction of a matching M to the set of agents
S, where v ∈ S is considered to be unmatched inM |S if he is matched inM but
M(v) is not in S.
3 The case of strict preferences
In this section we investigate popular matchings in instances of rp and mp where,
by definition, every agent’s preference list is strictly ordered.
3.1 Relationships between strongly popular, popular and stable
matchings
Let S1, S2, . . . Sk be a partition of V (G). Then for any two matchingsM andM
′,
P (M,M ′) = ∪ki=1PSi(M,M ′) and D(M,M ′) =
∑k
i=1DSi(M,M
′) by definition.
We will prove some useful lemmas by using the above identity for two particular
partitions.
First, let us consider the component-wise partition of V (G) for the symmetric
difference of two matchings M and M ′. For each component Gi of M ⊕M ′ let
Ci = V (Gi). We consider the following equation:
D(M,M ′) =
k∑
i=1
DCi(M,M
′) (1)
Note that if |Ci| = 1 then it must be the case that DCi(M,M ′) = 0 since
the corresponding agent is either unmatched in both M andM ′ or has the same
partner in M and M ′.
Lemma 1 For a given instance of rp, a matching M is popular if and only if,
for any other matching M ′, DCi(M,M
′) ≥ 0 for each component Gi of M⊕M ′,
where Ci = V (Gi).
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in our corresponding technical report
[3]. A similar statement holds for strongly popular matchings, as follows.
Lemma 2 For a given instance of rp, a matching M is strongly popular if and
only if, for any other matching M ′, DCi(M,M
′) > 0 for each component Gi of
M ⊕M ′, where Ci = V (Gi) and |Ci| ≥ 2.
See [3] for the proof of Lemma 2. Now, let M , M ′ be any two matchings and
let F =M ′\M = {e1, e2, . . . , ek}. Further letX ⊆ V (G) be the set of agents cov-
ered by F and let X¯ = V (G) \X . Considering the partition {E1, E2, . . . Ek, X¯},
where Ei represents the end vertices of the edge ei, we have
D(M ′,M) =
k∑
i=1
DEi(M
′,M) +DX¯(M
′,M). (2)
This identity leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose that we are given an instance of rp and two matchings M
and M ′.
a) If M ′ ≻M then M ′ must contain an edge that is blocking for M .
b) If M is stable then M is popular.
c) IfM is stable andM ′ is popular thenM ′ covers all the vertices thatM covers,
implying |M ′| ≥ |M |, and DEi(M ′,M) = 0 for each ei ∈ M ′ \M (i.e., in
each pair corresponding to an edge of M ′ \M exactly one agent prefers M ′
to M and the other prefers M to M ′).
The proof of Lemma 3 can be found in [3].
We note that the result of Lemma 3(b) was proved by Ga¨rdenfors [11] for mp.
It is straightforward to verify that if I is an instance of rp and M is a strongly
popular matching in I then M is the only popular matching in I. This implies
that an instance of rp admits at most one strongly popular matching.
The following proposition was proved by Ga¨rdenfors [11] for mp. Here we
generalise the result to the rp context.
Proposition 4 Let I be an instance of rp and let M be a strongly popular
matching in I. Then M is stable in I.
Proof. If M is not stable then let {ai, aj} be a blocking pair of M . Let M ′
be a matching formed from M as follows: (i) remove the edge {ai,M(ai)} if
ai is matched in M , (ii) remove the edge {aj,M(aj)} if aj is matched in M ,
then (iii) add the edge {ai, aj}. Then |P (M ′,M)| = 2 whilst |P (M,M ′)| ≤ 2,
contradicting the strong popularity of M . Hence M is stable in I. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3(b) and Proposition 4 thus give the following chain of implications
involving properties of a matching M in an instance I of rp:
strongly popular⇒ stable⇒ popular⇒maximal
Examples to illustrate the following facts are given in [3]. An instance of rp
may not admit a popular matching, but a popular matching may exist even if the
instance does not admit a stable matching. Moreover, a unique stable matching
(which is also a unique popular matching) is not necessarily strongly popular.
Therefore the converse to each of the above implications is not true in general.
In the case of MP, examples are given to show that a popular matching can be
larger than a stable matching, a maximum cardinality matching need not be
popular, and the relation ≻ can cycle (even if a stable matching exists).
3.2 Testing for and finding a strongly popular matching
We begin this section by giving an O(m) algorithm that tests a given stable
matching for strong popularity. Let I be an instance of rp and letM be a stable
matching in I. Define the graph HM = (A,EM ), where
EM =
{
{ai, aj} ∈ E : ai is unmatched in M or prefers aj to M(ai) ∨aj is unmatched in M or prefers ai to M(aj)
}
.
Lemma 5 Let I be an instance of rp and let M be a stable matching in I. Let
HM be the graph defined above. Then M is strongly popular in I if and only if
HM contains no alternating cycle or augmenting path relative to M .
Proof. Strong popularity implies that no such alternating cycle or augmenting
path exists in HM relative toM by Lemma 2. This is because ifM
′ is the match-
ing obtained by switching edges along this alternating path (or cycle) and Ci
denotes the set of agents involved then it would be the case that DCi(M,M
′) ≤ 0
in this component. On the other hand, suppose thatM is stable but not strongly
popular, i.e., there is a matching M ′ such that D(M ′,M) = 0. The statements
of Lemma 3(c) hold in this case too by the very same argument used in the
proof of that result. The fact that M ′ covers all the vertices that are covered by
M means that each component of M ′ ⊕M is either an alternating cycle or an
augmenting path. And since DEi(M
′,M) = 0 for each ei ∈M ′ \M , every edge
in M ′ \M must belong to HM . ⊓⊔
Based on Lemma 5 we can give a linear time algorithm for the problem of
finding a strongly popular matching as indicated by the following theorem.
Theorem 6 Given an instance I of rp, we may find a strongly popular matching
or report that none exists in O(m) time.
Proof. We firstly test whether I admits a stable matching in O(m) time [13,
Section 4.5.2]. If no such matching exists, I does not admit a strongly popular
matching by Proposition 4. Now suppose that I admits a stable matching M .
Then I admits a strongly popular matching if and only ifM is strongly popular.
For, suppose that I admits a strongly popular matching M ′ 6= M . Then M ′
is certainly popular, and M is popular by Lemma 3(b), a contradiction to the
fact that if a strongly popular matching exists then no other popular matching
exists for the instance. By Lemma 5, M is strongly popular if and only if HM
contains no augmenting path or alternating cycle relative toM . Clearly HM has
O(n) vertices and O(m) edges. We may test for the existence of each of these
structures in O(m) time (see [5, 7] and [6] respectively). ⊓⊔
3.3 Testing for popularity
In order to test a matching M in a given instance of rp for popularity, we
form a weighted graph HM as follows. The vertices of HM are A ∪ A′, where
A′ = {a′1, . . . , a′n}. The edges of HM are E ∪ E′ ∪ E′′, where E′ = {{a′i, a′j} :
{ai, aj} ∈ E} and E′′ = {{ai, a′i} : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. For each edge {ai, aj} ∈ E, we
define δi,j as follows:
δi,j =


0, if {ai, aj} ∈M
1
2
, if ai is unmatched in M or prefers aj to M(ai)
− 1
2
, otherwise
For each edge {ai, aj} ∈ E, we define the weight of {ai, aj} in HM to be δi,j+δj,i.
Similarly, for each edge {a′i, a′j} ∈ E′, we define the weight of {a′i, a′j} in HM to
be δi,j+ δj,i. Finally, for each edge {ai, a′i} ∈ E′′, we define the weight of {ai, a′i}
in HM to be -1 if ai is matched inM , and 0 otherwise. It is clear that the weight
of each edge belongs to the set {−1, 0, 1}.
In what follows, given a matching M in G, we define M ′ to be a matching
in HM such that M
′ = {{a′i, a′j} : {ai, aj} ∈M}.
Lemma 7 Let I be an instance of rp and let M be a matching in I. Let HM be
the weighted graph defined above. Then M is popular if and only if a maximum
weight perfect matching in HM has weight 0.
Proof. Let M1 be any matching in I, and let AM1 denote the agents in A who
are matched in M1. Define the matching
S(M1) =M1 ∪M ′1 ∪ {{ai, a′i} : ai ∈ A\AM1}.
We claim that wt(S(M1)) = D(M1,M), where wt(M
∼) is the weight of a
matching M∼ in HM . To show this let M
′′
1 = {{ai, a′i} : ai ∈ A \AM1}. Also let
X = M1 \M . Define n−, n0, n+ to be the numbers of edges of weight −1, 0, 1
in X respectively. Also define n′′
−
to be the number of edges of weight −1 in
M ′′1 . Then wt(S(M1)) = 2(n+ − n−) − n′′−. Also |P (M1,M)| = n0 + 2n+ and
|P (M,M1)| = n0 + 2n− + n′′−. So wt(S(M1)) = D(M1,M) as claimed. Now
suppose that a maximum weight perfect matching in HM has weight 0. Suppose
M is not popular. Then there is a matching M1 such that D(M1,M) > 0. But
wt(S(M1)) = D(M1,M), a contradiction.
Conversely suppose that M is popular. By the above claim, wt(S(M)) =
D(M,M) = 0. Suppose that S(M) is not a maximum weight perfect matching
in HM . LetM
∗ be a perfect matching in HM such that wt(M
∗) > 0. Then either
S(M1) or S(M2) has positive weight, where M1 = M
∗|A and M2 = {{ai, aj} :
{a′i, a′j} ∈ M∗|A′}. Hence by the above claim, it follows that either M1 or M2
respectively is more popular than M , a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Theorem 8 Given an instance I of rp and a matching M in I, we can test
whether M is popular in O(
√
nα(n,m)m log3/2 n) time.
Proof. Clearly HM has O(n) vertices and O(m) edges. The current fastest algo-
rithm for finding a maximum weight perfect matching in a weighted graph with
weights {−1, 0, 1} has complexity O(
√
nα(n,m)m log3/2 n) [8]. ⊓⊔
It is clear that a perfect matching M∗ of positive weight exists in HM if and
only if HM admits an alternating cycle (relative to S(M)) of positive weight. It
is an open question whether testing for such an alternating cycle is possible in
a better running time than finding a maximum weight perfect matching in the
general case.
However, this is possible in the mp case. First we observe that if G is bipartite
then HM is also bipartite. Then the problem of finding an alternating cycle of
positive weight can be reduced to the problem of finding a directed cycle of
positive weight in DM , where DM is a directed graph obtained by orienting the
edges of HM in the following way: all the edges of S(M) are directed from the
men to the women and all the other edges are directed from the women to the
men. The problem of finding a directed cycle of positive weight in a directed
graph with weights {−1, 0, 1} (or reporting that none exists) can be solved in
O(
√
nm) time by the algorithm of Goldberg [12]. This implies the following
result.
Theorem 9 Given an instance I of mp and a matching M in I, we can test
whether M is popular in O(
√
nm) time.
4 The case of preferences with ties
In this section we consider popular matchings in instances of rpt and mpt.
4.1 Some results extended to the case of ties
It is not hard to see that Proposition 4 continues to hold in the presence of ties.
However, one of the key differences is that stability no longer necessarily implies
popularity, so that, in particular, it is not necessarily the case that an instance
of mpt admits a popular matching (this is illustrated with an example in [3]).
The algorithm for testing the popularity of a matching in an instance of rp
can be extended to the ties case in a natural way, namely by setting δi,j to be
0 if {ai, aj} ∈ M or if ai is indifferent between aj and M(ai). As a result we
will have weights {−1,− 1
2
, 0, 1
2
, 1} in HM but the technique and the complexity
of the popularity checking algorithm (in both the rpt and mpt cases) does
not change. On the other hand, the algorithm for finding a strongly popular
matching no longer works for the case of ties.
However we can still check the strong popularity of a matching, using a similar
technique to that used for popularity checking, in the following way. A matching
M is strongly popular if and only if every perfect matching in HM , excluding
S(M), has negative weight. That is, if every perfect matching M∗ 6= S(M) in
HM has weight at most − 12 . We can reduce this decision problem to another
maximum weight perfect matching problem, where wε(e) = w(e) − ε = −ε for
every edge e ∈ S(M) (and wε(e) = w(e) for every edge e of HM not in S(M))
where ε < 1
2n . Here S(M) is the only perfect matching of weight 0 for w if and
only if the maximum weight of a perfect matching in HM is −εn for wε.
To facilitate description of some of the subsequent results in this section, we
introduce some shorthand notation for variants of the popular matching problem,
as follows:
pop-mpt/rpt: the problem of determining whether a popular matching exists,
given an instance of mpt/rpt;
perfect-pop-mpt/rpt: the problem of determining whether there exists a per-
fect popular matching, given an instance of mpt/rpt.
4.2 Popular matching in the Marriage Problem with Ties
We next show that the problem of deciding whether a perfect popular matching
exists, given an instance of mpt, is NP-complete.
Theorem 10 perfect-pop-mpt is NP-complete.
Proof (The construction only).
We reduce from exact-mm, that is the problem of deciding, given a graph
G and an integer K, whether G admits a maximal matching of size exactly
K. exact-mm is NP-complete even for subdivision graphs of cubic graphs [23].
Suppose that we are given an instance I of exact-mm with the above restriction
on a graph G = (A ∪ B,E), where A = {u1, . . . , un1} and B = {v1, . . . , vn2}
satisfying 3n1 = 3|A| = 2|B| = 2n2. We construct an instance I ′ of perfect-
pop-mpt with a graph G′ = (U ∪ V,E′), where U and V are referred to as
women and men respectively, as follows. Initially we let U = A and V = B.
The proper part of I ′ is the exact copy of I such that all neighbours of
each agent ui ∈ A (and vj ∈ B) are in a tie in ui’s (and vj ’s) preference
list. The agents of the proper part are called proper agents. For each edge
{ui, vj} ∈ E(G), we create two vertices, si,j ∈ V and ti,j ∈ U with three edges,
{ui, si,j}, {si,j, ti,j}, {ti,j, vj} in E′, where ui (and vj) prefers her (his) proper
neighbours to si,j (to ti,j) respectively, si,j prefers ui to ti,j , whilst ti,j is indif-
ferent between si,j and vj . Moreover, for a given ui ∈ A, all agents of the form
si,j such that {ui, vj} ∈ E are tied in ui’s list in I ′, and similarly, for a given
vj ∈ B, all agents of the form ti,j such that {ui, vj} ∈ E are tied in vj ’s list in
I ′. We complete the construction by adding two sets of garbage collectors to V
and U , namely X = {x1, . . . , xn1−K} of size n1 −K and Y = {y1, . . . , yn2−K}
of size n2 −K, respectively, such that these sets of agents appear in a tie at the
end of each proper agent’s list. That is, each ui ∈ A has the members of X in a
tie at the tail of her list and each vj ∈ B has the members of Y in a tie at the
tail of his list. The members of the garbage collectors are indifferent between the
proper agents.
We need to show that I admits a maximal matching of size K if and only
if I ′ admits a perfect popular matching. This part of the proof can be found in
[3]. ⊓⊔
It is possible to extend the result of Theorem 10 to the case where we do not
require a popular matching to be perfect. This leads to the following result, the
proof of which can be found in [3].
Theorem 11 pop-mpt is NP-complete.
These results imply the NP-completeness of perfect-pop-rpt and pop-
rpt.
5 Open problems
In this paper we proved that the problem of finding a perfect popular matching
(or reporting that none exists) given an mpt instance is NP-hard, and that the
problem remains NP-hard even if we merely seek a popular matching (of arbi-
trary size). However, the complexity of the problem of constructing a maximum
cardinality popular matching in an mp instance remains open. The other main
open problem is whether finding a popular matching (or reporting that none ex-
ists) is possible in polynomial time for an instance of rp. A third open problem
is the complexity of finding a strongly popular matching (or reporting that none
exists), for an instance of rpt. Finally we remark that the above-mentioned NP-
hardness results were established for mpt instances with incomplete lists, and it
is open as to whether the same results hold for complete lists.
Our results and the main open problems are summarised in Table 1.
The problem of finding a Marriage instances Roommates instances
popular matching that is strict with ties strict with ties
arbitrary P [9, 11] NPC open NPC
maximum open NPC open NPC
Table 1. Complexity results for problems of finding popular matchings
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